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2011. Building upon earlier indices we develop a conceptual framework 
informed by transaction cost theory and derive measures which emphasize the 
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Findings reveal harmonization of the regulative aspects of patent protection 
internationally in the post-TRIPs era but not of overall national patent systems. 
The index should inform studies on the relationship between national patent 
systems and a range of international business and other phenomena.    
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International patent systems strength 1998 - 2011 
1.  Introduction 
This study reports a new composite index of patent system strength for 48 
countries annually for the period 1998 to 2011. Research shows that national 
patent protection strength has a strong determinant effect on a range of 
international business activity, including foreign direct investment, inter-firm 
alliances, exports, R&D, innovation, licensing and technology transfer (Allred 
& Park, 2007; Fink & Maskus, 2005, Ghauri & Rao, 2009; Hagedoorn, Cloodt 
& Van Kranenburg, 2005; Ivus, 2010; Kafouros & Forsans, 2012; Khoury & 
Peng, 2011; Papageorgiadis, Cross & Alexiou, 2013). Much of this empirical 
investigation has relied upon quantifiable measures that capture the evolution of 
patent systems in countries. To this end, numerous intellectual property (IP) 
indices have been devised, such as those by Rapp and Rozek (1990), Ginarte 
and Park (1997) and Ostergard (2000). However, these existing measures have 
become outdated, with the exception of the most frequently employed indices 
of national patent protection strength reported by Ginarte and Park (1997) and 
updated by Park (2008). These two indices (henceforth the GP indices) have 
become widely accepted as standard measures of patent protection levels (and 
arguably, of IP protection regimes in general) not least because they account for 
the presence, or not, of particular items of patent-related book-law contained in 
the statutes of countries.1   
 
1 According to the Social Sciences Citation Index, the total citation count for the GP indices is 
presently in excess of 300 (and 1300 in Google Scholar), demonstrating how extensively they 
have been applied in international business and related research.   
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In contrast to what the GP indices measure, the ability of firms to extract 
value, or to appropriate returns, from the patents they own is dependent not 
only upon the existence of patent-related book-law in the legal framework of 
countries but also upon the ability of government agents and institutional actors 
(such as the judiciary, law enforcement and customs officials) to administer, 
police and enforce these laws in practice (Keupp, Beckenbauer & Gassmann, 
2010; Shultz & Saporito, 1996; Staake & Fleisch, 2010; Yang, 2005; Yang, 
Fryxell & Sie, 2008; Yang, Sonmez & Bosworth, 2004). Indeed, as Park (2008, 
p. 761) points out, the GP indices were “designed to provide an indicator of the 
strength of patent protection, not the quality of patent systems”. Consequently, 
although the GP indices are commonly used as proxies for the regulatory 
environment that underpins national patent protection in terms of book-law, 
more research needs to be done to quantify additional aspects of the patent 
system of countries within which patent rights are granted, infringed and 
enforced (Arora, 2009; Cockburn, 2009; Ivus, 2010; Maskus, 2000). We 
achieve this with the new index reported here. 
The need for a new index that measures the strength of a national patent 
system – and which places particular emphasis on the effectiveness of 
enforcement practices, together with the overall administrative functioning of 
the system as perceived by managers – can be justified on both managerial and 
empirical grounds. From a managerial perspective, the original Ginarte and 
Park index was created largely in response to a time when levels of book-law 
protection of patents were highly variable across countries (Chaudhry & Walsh, 
1995). Widespread adoption of principles set down by the Trade-Related 
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Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS) agreement has harmonized to a 
great extent the minimum standards of legal protection for patents offered by 
countries.2 However, the same cannot be said for enforcement levels (IPO, 
2011; Li & Correa, 2009; OECD, 2009; USTR, 2011). The fact that patent 
enforcement levels and practices are often ineffective or inadequate in countries 
can be demonstrated in three ways: (i) by the latest IP-related plurilateral Anti-
Counterfeiting Trade Agreement (ACTA), concluded in October 2011, which 
aims to establish international standards for IP enforcement across signatory 
States on the basis that current conditions are often unsatisfactory; (ii) by the 
patent enforcement-related clauses and conditions which are regularly included 
for the same reason in bilateral trade and investment agreements (such as the 
EU-India and EU-China trade agreements presently under negotiation); and (iii) 
by the growing extent of counterfeiting and piracy around the world, which is 
estimated to account for between 1 and 2 per cent of current global merchandise 
trade in value terms (OECD, 2009; Staake & Fleisch, 2010).  
On the empirical front, several recent contributions to the international 
business literature have called for stronger measures to facilitate understanding 
of how institutional variables such as IP systems matter to the strategic 
management of intangible assets as firms extend their activities abroad (Peng, 
2003; Peng, Sun, Pinkham & Chen, 2009). As Jain (2002) comments, 
international business researchers need to be more mindful of IP-related issues 
 
2 The TRIPS agreement (instigated in January 1995) is the most comprehensive multilateral 
agreement related to intellectual property rights (IPR). However, the agreement allows for 
numerous exclusions, and includes nothing about how individual countries should enforce their 
IP laws. We are grateful to an anonymous reviewer for this observation. 
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in general, and especially in relation to variable levels of enforcement and other 
factors that influence patent protection intensity in a country. For all these 
reasons, the need exists for a new index that extends the scope of coverage 
offered by the GP indices by accounting for variable levels of patent 
enforcement across countries. 
This study contributes to existing literature by reporting a novel 
composite measure of national patent system strength for 48 countries and 
economies annually for the period 1998 to 2011. Following the rationale of 
transaction cost theory, we calculate a new dataset that captures how managers 
perceive levels of patent enforcement in a country as well as the general 
effectiveness and efficiency of the national patent system. To create the new 
index we use a number of uniform techniques recommended by the 
Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development in their Handbook 
on Constructing Composite Indicators (OECD, 2008). This is arguably the most 
authoritative guide currently available on the creation of nationally comparable 
measures of macro phenomena (Archibugi, Denni & Filippetti, 2009; 
Fagerberg, Srholec & Knell, 2007). 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section two 
provides a brief background on patent systems and the IP index literature to 
which this study relates. Our purpose here is to identify attributes that have led 
the GP indices to become widely used as proxies for national patent and overall 
IP protection strength, along with methodological insights from related studies 
which we use to inform the design of the new index. In section three we 
develop a conceptual framework upon which the design of the new international 
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patent systems strength index is based, following the directions of transaction 
costs theory. Section four then explains the methodology used to construct the 
new composite index, with particular emphasis placed on transparency to 
facilitate replication and future extension. In section five we report on the new 
index for 48 countries and discuss its contribution in the context of a 
comparison with the individual country scores of the GP index and with 
national GDP per capita data. Finally, in section six we conclude by discussing 
the implications of this study for both researchers and managerial decision-
making. 
 
2.  Background  
2.1. National patent system 
Patents represent a key source of competitive advantage to innovative firms 
since, once granted, legal redress by the owner can be sought if the patent is 
infringed or otherwise misappropriated through the sale, manufacture, use, 
importation or distribution of the patented technology without permission 
(Macqueen, Waelde & Laurie, 2008; WIPO, 2008). A national patent system 
within which ownership rights are conferred is comprised of three elements, 
namely: (i) the legal framework and instruments set out in book-law that define 
and enable the formal protection of patents in a country; (ii) the operations 
which enforce these rights in practice; and (iii) the efficient governance and 
activities of public and private organizations concerned with the operations of 
the patent system (Gowers, 2006). The legal framework sets forth the rules that 
patent owners can use to defend and uphold their rights. A balanced and 
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coherent legal framework provides a safeguard for patent owners who can seek 
redress from the judicial system should misuse, infringement or 
misappropriation of legal rights occur (Papageorgiadis et al., 2013; Peng et al., 
2009). However, the availability of a comprehensive legal framework is a 
necessary but not sufficient condition to defend against imitation and 
misappropriation. In order to uphold their rights, the patent owner is required to 
engage with the administrative bodies responsible for the governance and 
operations of the patent system and, especially, enforcement-related actors. The 
administrative bodies are responsible for the clerical functions required for the 
patent system to operate effectively, such as the efficiency of prior art searches, 
patent examinations, and timely responses to applicants (Yang et al., 2008). 
Similarly, enforcement-related operations involve the existence, availability, 
effectiveness and quality of organizations and firms such as police forces and 
customs officials as well as private enforcement agencies who facilitate the 
effective use of the patent system by economic actors (Keupp et al., 2010; 
Shultz & Saporito, 1996; Yang et al., 2008).  
2.2. Indices measuring intellectual property strength 
Over the last thirty years, many studies have reported indices of IP strength in 
an effort to quantify and depict differences in the level of book-law protection 
or enforcement offered by the IP systems of countries over certain periods of 
time.3 In this context, the two dominant approaches used are as follows: (i) 
indices which seek to quantify the existence and scope of IP law (book-law, 
 
3 For a comprehensive review of this literature and a discussion of key limitations associated 
with extant IP indices see Papageorgiadis (2010). 
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statutes, and so forth) and (ii) indices which seek to quantify differences in the 
quality of IP enforcement.  
2.2.1. Indices measuring IP book-law protection 
Measurement of dissimilarities between book-law protection provisions within 
the regulative systems of countries is the most widely adopted approach 
followed in the IP index literature. These studies account for the level of book-
law protection in a country using binary variables to depict the existence (or 
not) of particular items of IP-related legislation (Bosworth, 1980; Ferrantino, 
1993; Ginarte & Park, 1997; Kondo, 1995; Rapp & Rozek, 1990; Seyoum, 
1996; Van Kranenburg & Hogenbirk, 2005).4 In general, a country is awarded 
one point when a certain legal provision is incorporated into its IP regulatory 
system and none when it is absent. In addition, countries are rewarded if they 
are members of an international IP treaty such as the Paris or Berne 
Convention. A final composite index is then calculated by summating the points 
received from all variables. The higher the number of legal provisions offered 
the higher a country scores in terms of the strength of its regulatory system. 
With the exception of the GP index, all the studies following this approach use 
differing methodologies to derive values for various country sets and different 
time periods prior to 1998 and were then discontinued.  
The first iteration of the GP index quantified the strength of book-law 
patent protection for 110 countries, in five-year intervals for the period 1960 to 
 
4 Rapp and Rozek (1990) and Seyoum (1996) used the US Chamber of Commerce Intellectual 
Property Task Force (1987) Guidelines for Standards for the Protection and Enforcement of 
Intellectual Property Rights to capture enforcement-related book-law provisions in countries but 
not the enforcement of these laws in practice (Ostergard, 2000).  
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1990 (Ginarte & Park, 1997). It was subsequently extended by Park (2008) up 
to the year 2005 and for a total of 122 countries. The index is comprised of five 
constructs, namely: (i) patent coverage, (ii) membership of international 
treaties, (iii) enforcement mechanisms, (iv) restrictions on patent rights, and (v) 
duration of patent protection. The ‘coverage’ construct includes eight variables 
designed to capture the availability of patent protection in certain industrial 
sectors where patent protection is perceived as being particularly beneficial to 
the patent holder, such as the patentability of pharmaceutical products. The 
‘membership of international treaties’ construct includes five variables relating 
to whether or not a country is signatory to patent-related treaties, such as the 
TRIPS agreement. It should be noted that the TRIPS agreement is concerned 
not only with matters relating to patents but also with other types of IP such as 
copyright and trademarks. The ‘enforcement mechanism’ construct captures the 
existence of laws that can enable patent enforcement, such as the availability of 
preliminary injunctions. Importantly, in the GP indices this construct concerns 
only the availability of book-law protection, not how such laws are actually 
enforced. Nor does it concern other enforcement-related activities. The 
‘restrictions on patent rights’ construct considers the existence of laws that have 
the potential to negatively affect the appropriation of patent rights by owners, 
such as those that enable the revocation of patents. Finally, the fifth construct, 
‘duration of patent protection’, is measured by one variable where countries 
offering protection for less than 20 years from the date of application score 
lower than those meeting or exceeding this condition. The summated value of 
the binary variables constitutes the total index number for that particular 
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construct. The overall patent protection score of a country reported in the GP 
indices then consists of the unweighted sum of component construct values, 
with scores ranging between ‘0’ (which signals an absence of patent protection 
in a country) and ‘5’ (which signals much higher levels of protection).    
Two important features of the methodology used to create the GP 
indices have reinforced their usefulness as quantitative tools for researchers. 
Firstly, the conceptual framework is easily comprehensible, whereby the five 
constructs concerning patent-related law are clearly identified, defined and 
quantified. Consequently, what the indices seek to proxy for and why is clearly 
discernible. This means that researchers can readily determine if they are fit for 
purpose. Secondly, the methodology employed is transparent, enabling 
replication and extension of the index if required. Both these features have 
resulted in the GP indices becoming the IP index of choice for international 
business scholarship, as well as by policy-making organizations (Arora, 2009; 
Cockburn, 2009; Intellectual Property Office, 2011).  
2.2.2. Indices measuring IP enforcement 
The second methodological approach found in the IP index literature focuses on 
quantifying the enforcement-related aspects of the IP system. Indices that 
sought to measure IP enforcement levels were developed for selected years in 
the 1990s and were subsequently discontinued, mainly due to the difficulty 
associated with identifying and collecting relevant data (Gadbaw & Richards, 
1988; Marron & Steel, 2006; McCalman, 2004; Ostergard, 2000; Smarzynska, 
2004). The studies by Gadbaw and Richards (1988) and Ostergard (2000) 
applied content analysis of US governmental and agency reports about the 
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quality of IP protection and enforcement in different countries. For example, 
Ostergard (2000) calculated an IP enforcement index using content analysis of 
the Country Reports on Economic Policy and Trade Practices published by the 
US Department of State (USDS, 2013). The USDS report described in 
qualitative terms IP enforcement levels evident in different countries.5 
Ostergard collated time series data for 76 countries across three time intervals 
(1988, 1991 and 1994). Similarly, Smarzynska (2004) developed an index that 
proxies for IP enforcement in 24 countries for the year 1995, and used it in a 
study together with the GP index. This index was calculated using evidence 
derived from the qualitative analysis of IP systems in the US Trade 
Representative’s (USTR) Special 301 Report which reviews IP protection and 
enforcement issues for countries on an annual basis (USTR, 2013). Finally, 
Marron and Steel (2006) attempted to account for IP enforcement using piracy 
rates calculated by the Business Software Alliance for the period 1994 to 1997 
in 70 countries, while McCalman (2004) used the Corruption Perceptions Index 
(CPI) published by Transparency International in conjunction with the GP 
index to develop a composite index of enforcement strength in 1997 for 40 
countries. 
 This literature on IP-related indices – most notably the GP indices –
provides a useful platform on which to base the design of a new international 
patent systems strength index, especially with regard to methodology, as we 
explain below. Following OECD (2008) guidelines on the construction of 
composite indicators, we first derive a conceptual framework which is then 
 
5 USDS abolished the report used by Ostergard (2000) in 2002 (USDS, 2013). 
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used to identify the variables required to calculate the new index. We now 
discuss and explain the component elements of a patent system and establish a 
conceptual framework using transaction costs theory to illustrate how it impacts 
on international business activity.  
 
3.  Conceptual framework and theoretical foundation  
3.1. The effect of patent systems on international business activity 
Studies show that firms encounter difficulties when engaging with foreign 
institutions that are substantively different, or “distant”, from their home 
institution or those with which they are already familiar (Kostova, 1999; Xu & 
Shenkar, 2002). Firms seeking to appropriate value from their intellectual assets 
need to ensure that they adequately account for institutional differences 
associated with a host country (Kostova, 1999). The performance of institutions 
such as the patent system becomes crucial when firms engage in cross-border 
transactions (Henisz, 2003; Mudambi & Navarra, 2002; Peng, 2002, 2003). The 
nature, structure and effectiveness of a national patent system impacts on the 
way that firms are able to appropriate or extract value from their innovations 
and, it follows, how business activity is organized and conducted within the 
system and country (Teece, 2006).  
According to Hargreaves (2011), the patent system imposes transaction 
costs to firms in the form of search, administration and enforcement costs. 
Transaction costs arise mainly from interactions between the patent system and 
the strategies that patent owners undertake in order to successfully exploit their 
intellectual assets (Teece, 2006). Friction caused by institutional inefficiency of 
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the patent system raises the transaction costs that a company faces (Demirbag, 
Glaister & Tatoglu, 2007; Jarzabkowski, 2008). In turn, and following 
transaction costs thinking, the patent system influences firm decision-making 
such as whether to internalize activities or transact outside corporate boundaries 
using external markets (Papageorgiadis et al., 2013). Consequently, it is 
necessary to understand the transaction costs that companies experience when 
interacting with a country’s patent system. 
3.2. Transaction costs originating from engagement with the patent system 
Following the thinking and terminology of Hargreaves (2011) and Williamson 
(1975) we recognize three specific types of transaction costs which arise from 
the interactions of foreign firms with the patent system of host countries, 
namely servicing costs, property rights protection costs and monitoring costs 
(see also Anderson & Gatignon, 1986; Clegg & Cross, 2000).  
3.2.1. Servicing costs 
Servicing costs are those costs that arise from the transfer of patent rights to a 
contracting party (either a related or unrelated concern) in a host country (Clegg 
& Cross, 2000). Servicing costs are generated from both within and beyond the 
boundaries of the firm. Internally, servicing costs consist of, inter alia, those 
costs associated with (i) codifying the intellectual asset to facilitate its transfer, 
(ii) implementing security measures to mitigate the threat of inappropriate 
leakage of intellectual assets to rivals, and (iii) education, training and support 
of contracting parties on how to effectively operationalize or exploit the 
intellectual asset, such as the provision of practical advice, expertise and know-
how (Clegg & Cross, 2000; Keupp et al., 2010; Shultz & Saporito, 1996). 
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Greater absorptive capacity of the recipient will have the effect of reducing 
these internal servicing costs. Externally, servicing costs arise when dealing 
with the patent system of a country. External servicing costs are determined by 
(i) the quality of administration in terms of the efficiency, transparency and 
timeliness of agencies that deal with patent-related matters and their systems 
and routines; (ii) the complexity, clarity and communication of patent-related 
regulations and procedures; and (iii) the quality of administrative decisions 
made by government agencies who deal with patent-related matters for and on 
behalf of foreign and domestic firms. 
3.2.2. Property rights protection costs 
The transaction costs which arise from property rights protection relate to, first, 
whether or not ownership rights are upheld by the patent system when, for 
example, infringement cases are taken to court and, second, the general 
effectiveness of the judiciary, police forces, customs officials and other 
government agencies when undertaking patent enforcement-related activities. 
Should such actions fall short of the expectations of the patent owner, or are 
otherwise deficient, then costs will be incurred as steps are taken to ameliorate 
the effects of this outcome. With regard to the upholding of ownership rights, 
time-related issues are important, since there are various costs involved in the 
period between taking a patent-related case to court and the delivery of a 
verdict. Long delays translate to direct costs (in the form of legal fees, for 
example) and to the opportunity costs arising from the ability of the defendant 
to continue to profit from sales of the disputed articles (with regard to patent 
infringement cases). So far as enforcement efficiency is concerned, this 
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involves costs arising from the inefficiency of local judicial enforcement 
procedures (Yang et al., 2008). On the one hand, transaction costs will be lower 
when the judicial system is transparent, even-handed, independent and does not 
behave arbitrarily and when it functions efficiently in terms of resourcing levels 
and timeliness. On the other, an opaque, arbitrary or inefficient judicial system 
that is receptive to corrupt practices will elevate transaction costs for foreign 
firms engaging with a national patent system (Hillman & Keim, 1995; OECD, 
2009; Papageorgiadis et al., 2013; USTR, 2011). 
3.2.3. Monitoring costs 
Monitoring costs arise from the efforts undertaken to constrain the activities of 
those related or unrelated parties who behave opportunistically, thereby 
infringing upon the property rights of patent owners (Clegg & Cross, 2000; 
Shultz & Saporito, 1996). These concerns are closely related to the issues of 
opportunity cost and free-riding potential. A firm whose intellectual assets are 
exploited illegally may miss the opportunity to appropriate some or all of the 
market returns. In addition, any resulting infringement acts which are not 
pursued may help to establish a competitor in the marketplace who is then able 
to profit illegally from the intangible assets of the patent owner (Granstrand, 
1999; Maskus, 2000). Monitoring costs are thus incurred as the patent owner 
scans the marketplace to identify instances of infringement of its intellectual 
assets. Such costs also arise as the patent owner motivates, informs and 
influences the activities of the relevant police forces, border customs and other 
enforcement agencies in order to uphold their rights as and when patent 
infringement is spotted (Shultz & Saporito, 1996; Yang et al., 2008). Such 
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agencies can be ineffective in combatting infringement for a variety of reasons, 
including understaffing, lack of resourcing, inexperience, and corruption, 
amongst other things (USTR, 2013; Yang et al., 2008).  
To a great extent, the need for enforcement-related intervention will be 
dependent upon cultural and societal attitudes towards the production and 
consumption of infringing goods, as well as on public commitment to patent 
protection in general. Societal attitudes largely determine the extent to which 
infringing acts are acceptable and if a market exists for the consumption of 
infringing goods, since it is among society members that legitimization and 
approval is achieved. A society in which a significant majority regards the 
production, purchase and use of infringing products as acceptable behaviour is 
more likely to foster and legitimize such activity (Yang, 2005). Similarly, 
individuals may not be aware of what constitutes legal protection and the rights 
of patent owners, and may therefore be more prone to violate those rights in the 
belief that they are acting legally (Bryce & Rutter, 2005; Hung, 2003). In 
contrast, greater awareness of the positive economic effects of patents within a 
society will lead to higher commitment to patent protection (Lee & Yoo, 2009) 
since consumers understand better the benefits of an effective patent system 
(e.g. for employment or wealth creation reasons). Therefore, societal 
understanding of, and commitment to, patent protection as well as enforcement 
represent an important component of the national patent system. It contributes 
to the success of enforcement measures, and also to the propensity in a country 
for infringing goods to be manufactured or purchased.  
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Identification of these three types of transaction costs that arise from a 
patent owner’s interaction with the patent system enables us to construct the 
framework presented in Table 1. Here, we identify the focal transaction cost 
type, the precise component of the patent system which generates the cost, and 
the proxy variables we use to measure the component and build the index. The 
new index contains proxies for each of the transaction costs identified above. 
These focus on the enforcement dimension of the patent system as it is 
perceived by managers. 
--------------------------------Table 1 goes about here----------------------------- 
4. Data Sources 
We now discuss the secondary data and sources used to quantify the effect of 
transaction costs resulting from a firm’s interaction with the national patent 
system, as defined and described in our conceptual framework. To strengthen 
the reliability and validity of the new composite index, and to allow it to be 
regularly updated and recalculated (e.g. annually), it was decided a priori that 
the selection of secondary data should first satisfy six criteria. These were that 
the data should: (i) have a close conceptual relevance to the theoretical 
framework in order to serve as meaningful proxies of the patent system and its 
associated transaction costs; (ii) have an early date of initial publication to 
increase the longitudinality of the index; (iii) be collected consistently over time 
to enhance the reliability of the index; (iv) be reported frequently to strengthen 
the discriminatory power of the index; (v) cover a wide range of countries to 
bolster the applicability of the index; and (vi) be readily available to facilitate 




Following an extensive review, six secondary data sources were identified 
which satisfy each of the above criteria. These are: (i) the Global 
Competitiveness Report (GCR) of the World Economic Forum (WEF); (ii) the 
World Competitiveness Yearbook (WCY) of the International Institute of 
Management Development (IMD); (iii) the International Country Risk Guide 
(ICRG) published by the Political Risk Services (PRS) Group; (iv) the 
Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI) produced by Transparency International; 
(v) data on piracy rates reported by the Business Software Alliance (BSA); and 
(vi) the USTR Special 301 Report.  From these sources ten variables were 
obtained to proxy for each of the transaction costs constructs discussed above.   
4.1.1. The servicing costs measures 
The servicing costs construct is captured by one element, namely the “quality of 
IP administration”. Two variables are used to proxy for the measurement of this 
construct: firstly, the “bureaucracy quality index” reported in the ICRG and 
secondly, the “bureaucracy does not hinder business activity” indicator 
published in the WCY.  With regard to the first variable, the PRS Group ranks 
the perceived political risk levels of countries in the ICRG, in which the 
“bureaucracy quality index” is one of twelve components comprising the 
overall political risk score. This measures a country’s ability to implement its 
policies without significant changes and interruptions to government services. 
Therefore countries with weak bureaucracies which cannot absorb policy 
changes without affecting daily administration score low, whereas strong and 
established bureaucracies which act without government intervention score 
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high. The values assigned to this component range along a scale from “0” 
(weak bureaucracy) to “4” (strong bureaucracy). Our assumption is that the 
quality of those agencies which administer patent-related laws and regulations 
is approximated by the overall level of national bureaucratic performance as 
reflected by this index. Regarding the second variable, the IMD evaluates in the 
WCY the actual and perceived competitiveness of nations by, amongst other 
things, collecting annual data through its “Executive Opinion Survey”. The 
“bureaucracy does not hinder business activity” indicator is calculated from 
responses to this survey question, with a minimum score “0” equating to 
bureaucracy levels that heavily influence business activity, and the maximum 
“10” to bureaucracy that does not restrict business activity. We incorporate this 
variable to capture the additional effect of patent-related government agencies 
on business activity beyond the quality of these agencies as indicated by the 
ICRG score. 
4.1.2. The property rights protection costs measures 
The property rights protection construct is estimated using two elements, 
namely judicial enforcement and the level of corruption in the judiciary. We use 
three variables to proxy for the judicial enforcement component of the national 
patent system and one to proxy for corruption levels. With regard to judicial 
enforcement, first we take the indicator “justice is fairly administered” reported 
in the WCY. Again, this is constructed from survey responses and varies along 
a scale from “0” (‘low levels of fairness and even-handedness’) to “10” (‘high 
levels’).  We assume a close correlation between the way that patent rights are 
enforced by the judicial system of a country and respondents’ perceptions of the 
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overall fairness of a country’s judiciary.  Second, we employ the “law and 
order” indicator as quantified in the ICRG using two different sub-components, 
those of “law” and “order”, with both ranging from a minimum score of “0” to 
a maximum of “3”. The “law” sub-component is a measure of the strength and 
impartiality of a country’s legal system, while the “order” sub-component is 
calculated by evaluating popular beliefs concerning law enforcement (i.e. crime 
rates). The combined indicator therefore ranges along a scale from “0” to “6” (a 
summation of the two sub-variable scores). The third proxy derives from the 
“judicial independence” indicator originating from the annual “Executive 
Opinion Survey” published in the GCR, which was introduced in 1998 and is 
measured by executives’ responses to the question “Is the judiciary in your 
country independent from political influences of members of government, 
citizens or firms?”. The minimum score is “1” (political influence is high) while 
the maximum is “7” (the judicial system is entirely independent). Our 
assumption is that higher levels of political interference correlate to weaker 
judicial enforcement and therefore to higher property rights protection costs, 
especially in relation to the patent system.  Finally, following McCalman 
(2004) we proxy for levels of corruption in the judiciary using the Corruption 
Perceptions Index (CPI). This is an annual composite index calculated using 
data from thirteen different sources and ten institutions to estimate corruption 
levels in a country, with scores ranging from “0” (highly corrupt countries) to 
“10” (highly ‘clean’) (Transparency International, 2011).   
4.1.4. The monitoring costs measures 
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The monitoring costs construct is operationalized using five elements: (i) the 
perceptions of patent owners to changes in a country’s patent protection and 
enforcement regime; (ii) cultural and societal attitudes towards the purchase of 
infringing goods; (iii) the level of public commitment to patent protection in 
general; (iv) the effectiveness of police enforcement; and (v) the strength of 
border controls. We identify four variables to proxy for the measurement of 
these elements, namely: a) the “intellectual property rights” indicator reported 
in the WCY; b) the “intellectual property protection” indicator reported in the 
GCR; c) data from the Global PC Software Piracy study by the Business 
Software Alliance (BSA); and d) data from the USTR Special 301 Report. 
An indicator for “intellectual property rights” was introduced in the 
WCY in 1997 and is measured by managers’ responses to the statement 
“Intellectual property rights are adequately enforced”. The lowest score 
assignable is “0” (weak or non-existent IP enforcement), and the highest is “10” 
(the maximum level of IP enforcement available). We use this value to proxy 
for perceptions of patent owners towards national patent enforcement levels. 
Second, an “intellectual property protection” indicator was introduced in the 
GCR in 1997 and it is measured by executives’ responses to the statement 
“Intellectual property is well protected in your country”. The minimum score 
assignable is “1”, equating to weak or non-existent IP protection and the 
maximum is “7”, equating to protection levels comparable to “the world’s most 
stringent” (a concept not defined further). This value is used to measure 
perceived patent protection levels in countries. Third, the BSA publishes an 
annual report that estimates piracy levels and software-related revenue lost to 
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piracy.  We employ BSA data here on the basis that software piracy rates 
indicate the general preparedness of consumers in a country to acquire and use 
products of questionable origin (Marron & Steel, 2006). These data are used to 
proxy for the monitoring costs arising from two elements of the patent system, 
namely: (i) cultural and societal attitudes towards the purchase of infringing 
goods, and (ii) levels of public commitment to patent protection. The scale was 
inverted to align it with the directionality of our other variables.  
Finally, we construct a fourth indicator using the reviews of IP 
enforcement efforts of countries published annually by the USTR. This is used 
to measure the effectiveness of police enforcement and strength of border 
controls present in the patent system. The reviews are published annually in the 
“Special 301 Report”. Each report offers a qualitative assessment whereby 
countries that are considered to offer inadequate levels of IP protection and 
enforcement are grouped into one of three different categories, namely: (i) 
“Watch List”, (ii) “Priority Watch List” and (iii) “Section 306 Monitoring”. 
Countries named in the “Watch List” are those with problematic IP protection 
and enforcement levels. Those placed in the “Priority Watch List” suffer from 
the same issues but garner greater attention from the US government because of 
their importance in bilateral trade (i.e. they attract more complaints from US 
companies requesting remedial actions by US authorities).6 Lastly, the “Section 
306 Monitoring” list includes countries previously named in the “Priority Watch 
List” and that the USTR is monitoring closely with the aim of actually imposing 
 
6 The Special 301 Report has been criticised for categorizing countries not only on the basis of 




trade-related and other sanctions if they do not comply with its 
recommendations. Additionally, some countries are not named in specific USTR 
categories (due to their generally acceptable IP enforcement levels) but are still 
mentioned in the report because they are perceived to suffer certain 
enforcement-related deficiencies concerning particular aspects of the IP system. 
This suggests that these countries offer what firms and policy-makers might 
regard as an acceptable level of IP protection and enforcement but that this can 
still be improved in some way. On the other hand, countries not named in the 
report are assumed to present fewer patent enforcement-related concerns. To 
quantify the information contained in the Special 301 Report we follow 
Smarzynska (2004) who assigned different values depending on the list in which 
a country is placed. However, we go one step further in order to positively 
reward those countries which are not categorized, but are mentioned in the 
report in addition to those not mentioned at all. Thus data are codified with 
values ranging from a minimum of “1” (weak patent protection and 
enforcement) to a maximum of “5” (strong) depending on whether a country is 
listed in the USTR 301 report as follows: in “Section 306 Monitoring” (‘1’), in 
the “Priority Watch List” (‘2’), in the “Watch List” (‘3’), negative IP 
perceptions are indicated but the country is not named in an aforementioned list 
(‘4’), the country is not named in any aforementioned list or it is mentioned as a 
positive example of good practice in the area of patent protection and 
enforcement (‘5’).7  
 
7 Data for each year were coded on two separate occasions by three different coders, achieving 
the same result. 
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5.  International patent systems strength index: results and discussion 
We now report on the new international patent systems strength index. 
Following the recommendations of the OECD (2008) for composite index 
construction, we focus on (i) the normalization of data, (ii) multivariate analysis 
(in order to evaluate the index scales), (iii) weighting and aggregation of the 
data, and (iv) linkages with other variables.  
Because the data sources we employ use differing measurement scales, 
we first normalized all the data using a standardization technique (z-scores) to 
transform them into a single scale with a mean of zero (0) and a standard 
deviation of one (1) (OECD, 2008).8  There were no missing values in the 
dataset since countries for which data were not available were omitted from our 
calculations. To apply the multivariate tests, and in accordance with our 
conceptual framework, we categorized and aggregated the data according to the 
transaction cost construct they were used to proxy. This led to the derivation of 
scales that captured the effect of each of the three transaction cost constructs. 
Two multivariate analysis tests are commonly reported in the index scale 
construction literature, namely Cronbach’s coefficient alpha and factor analysis 
(OECD, 2008).  The Cronbach’s alpha test was applied to the servicing costs, 
property rights protection costs and monitoring costs constructs. Tests revealed 
strong internal consistency for each of the three constructs, with all variables 
scoring significantly higher or very close to the generally accepted 0.70 
threshold (Hair, Anderson, Tatham & Black, 2009; Nunnally, 1978). The 
 
8 A variety of different normalization techniques were considered (e.g. ranking, rescaling, 
distance to a reference indicator/country, and so forth) but were deemed irrelevant or 
inapplicable to our theoretical framework. 
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Cronbach’s alpha score for the property rights protection construct is 0.92, with 
a standard item alpha of 0.94. The monitoring cost construct also revealed an 
extremely high internal consistency with a Cronbach’s alpha score of 0.87, and 
a standard item alpha of 0.89. The Cronbach’s alpha test for the servicing cost 
construct also exhibited an acceptable score of 0.77, and a standardized item 
alpha of 0.82. Results of the Cronbach’s alpha test suggest that the variables 
used to estimate the three constructs form reliable scales that are internally 
consistent.  
 Factor analysis was then used to discern the relationship between the 
different component variables of each of the constructs and to inform the 
application of a weighting scheme to aggregate the variables into a single 
numerical value for each construct. According to the OECD (2008, p. 89), a 
weighting scheme derived from factor analysis “intervenes only to correct for 
overlapping information between two or more correlated indicators, and is not a 
measure of the theoretical importance of the associated indicator. If no 
correlation between indicators is found, then weights cannot be estimated with 
this method”. In other words, the weighting applied to construct the index does 
not differentiate between the importance of each factor but instead represents 
the highest possible variation in the indicators. Thus, “the composite 
(index/construct) no longer depends upon the dimensionality of the dataset but 
rather is based on the “statistical” dimensions of the data” (OECD, 2008, p. 89).  
The ordering of the variables and the weighting of each of the constructs is 
based on achieving high score variability (OECD, 2008). A more formal as well 
as general representation of the process underlying the widely used 
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methodological approach adopted in this study in relation to the construction of 
the index and composite indices can be expressed as follows:  
Index = ∑ "#$#%#&'  
where X1 denotes the variables used in the factor analysis and wi stands for the 
respective weights (variances) that have resulted from the factor analysis. As 
Table 2 shows, the communalities table for the monitoring cost construct 
revealed that all four variables are equally represented in the calculation of an 
aggregate index for this construct. The table of total variance explained 
indicates the weighting to be used to calculate the monitoring cost construct 
index, with the WEF IP protection variable receiving a weighting of 82%, the 
IMD IPR variable 10%, the BSA piracy rates variable 5%, and the USTR 
Special 301 Report variable 3%. Similarly, with regard to the property rights 
protection construct, the communalities table revealed that all four variables 
have a very good representation in the total scale of the construct. Findings 
indicated that the CPI component of this construct should receive the highest 
weight of 85%, with the WEF variable receiving 9%, the IMD judicial 
independence variable 3% and the ICRG law and order variable receiving 3%. 
Finally, the communalities table for the servicing costs construct also revealed 
an equal representation of the two component variables in each calculation. The 
ICRG bureaucracy variable should receive a weight of 85% and the IMD 
bureaucracy variable 15%. 
-----------------------------------Table 2 goes about here----------------------------- 
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The weighting scheme suggested by factor analysis was applied to the 
data for each of the variables within the servicing costs, property rights 
protection costs and monitoring costs constructs. This allowed us to calculate 
individual index scores that reflect the extent of transactions costs a firm is 
likely to experience as it engages with the patent system of a country. 
The same process was then followed to construct the overall composite 
index of international patent systems strength. Again, this was done using 
reliability and factor analyses to derive a composite index comprising the three 
previously calculated constructs. The reliability analysis revealed a high 
internal consistency for the composite index, receiving a Cronbach’s alpha 
score of 0.89, and a standardized item alpha of 0.95. The factor analysis test and 
the communalities table presented in Table 3 show that all factors have a very 
good representation in the composite index, with each having a much higher 
extraction score than 0.70.  
-----------------------------Table 3 goes about here-------------------------- 
Regarding the weighting scheme applied to the calculation of the 
composite index, the table of total variance explained indicates that the 
construct receiving the highest weight in the index is the property rights 
protection costs construct (accounting for 91% of the final variance), followed 
by the monitoring costs construct (6%), and the servicing costs construct (3%).   
Average values of the new international patent systems strength index 
for the period 1998 to 2011 are presented for 48 countries in Table 4, with 
higher values (maximum of 10) indicating stronger patent systems. Table 5 
presents annual values for each country across the same period.  As shown 
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above, the new index has been proven statistically to be reliable and internally 
consistent. The mean score for all countries is 6.3 with a standard deviation of 
2.1, suggesting that the average country measured by the composite index 
offers slightly higher than the medium levels of patent system strength for the 
14-year period in question. The lowest mean score is 2.9 for Venezuela (with a 
minimum of 2.5 for 2009, 2010 and 2011, respectively) and the highest is 9.5 
for Denmark and Finland (with maximum values of 9.9 for Finland in 2000 and 
Denmark in 1999, respectively).  
-----------------------------Tables 4 and 5 go about here-------------------------- 
5.1. The international patent systems strength index and GP indices compared 
We now compare the scores of the new international patent systems strength 
index with those of the GP indices for the year 2005. Our purpose is to 
investigate if there are any differences between the levels of national patent 
system strength as quantified here and book-law patent protection reported by 
the GP index. If such differences are observable, this would elucidate the added 
explanatory value of capturing enforcement-related issues associated with the 
patent system of countries in the new index. In addition, we regress the new 
index with data on national GDP per capita to reveal if it conforms to 
theoretical expectations.  
A simple regression between the international patent systems strength 
index and the GP indices shows a positive and significant relationship. The 
correlation coefficient between the two indices is relatively low at 0.58, with a 
total variance explained (R2) value of 0.30. To better comprehend this 
relationship we ran a paired two samples for means t-Test which revealed that 
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the two indices are not identical. Results indicate that they are different in terms 
of their values and range. This is to be expected, both in terms of 
conceptualization and theory, since the new international patent systems 
strength index was devised to go beyond the measurement of the book-law 
effects of the patent system as captured by the GP indices by quantifying 
enforcement-related issues that arise from engaging with this system.  
To investigate this relationship further, we compare diagrammatically 
the new index with the GP index for 2005 by transforming the latter into a 0 to 
10 scale, as seen in Figure 1.9  Substantial differences are observable between 
the scores of certain countries. A number of (mainly developing) countries, 
such as Argentina, China, India and Indonesia are scored lower by the new 
index than by the GP index. Whilst these countries have adapted their legal 
systems to include provisions for stronger patent protection (as required by the 
TRIPs agreement), and therefore score highly in the GP index, they remain 
weak in enforcing these laws as reflected in the new index (USTR, 2011). 
Additionally, the slightly lower values assigned by the new index to countries 
that score highly in the GP indices (e.g. the Netherlands) reflect certain 
enforcement-related deficiencies in countries with comparatively strong book-
law protection. In short, divergent performances across the two indices 
highlight variable conditions in terms of the levels of book-law protection for 
patents on offer in different countries and perceptions about how efficaciously 
these rights are enforced in practice. This is an important finding, because it 
 
9 Such transformation is not appropriate statistically but is done to show visually the differences 
in country scores across the two indices.  
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demonstrates that scholars investigating the relationship between patent 
strength and international business activity can use either the new index or the 
GP indices depending on whether the focus of attention is on the book-law or 
the enforcement aspect of the patent system of countries. Put another way, 
researchers whose subject of enquiry includes the enforcement dimension will 
be able to apply the new international patent systems strength index, whilst 
those focusing on the role of the regulative book-law environment can continue 
to use the GP indices.  
-----------------------------Figure 1 goes about here-------------------------- 
5.2. The new index and GDP per capita 
To investigate further the performance of certain countries in the new 
composite index, and to reveal if it conforms to theoretical expectations, we 
regressed the mean scores with the mean of national GDP per capita data for the 
years 1998 to 2011. Prior research indicates that higher national GDP per capita 
levels are closely associated with stronger patent protection levels (Gould & 
Gruben, 1996; Park & Ginarte, 1997; Pryor, 2006; Thompson & Rushing, 
1999). This is because as incomes rise so do consumer demand for higher 
quality and more differentiated products on the one hand and the technological 
capabilities of domestic producers on the other, putting pressure on national 
governments to strengthen their IP system (Maskus, 2000). GDP per capita 
figures (at current prices) were obtained from the United Nations Statistics 
Division for each of the 48 countries included in the new international patent 
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systems strength index.10 In line with theoretical expectations, a positive and 
statistically significant relationship was found between GDP per capita and the 
new index scores (with a correlation coefficient of 0.69 and an R2 score of 0.58) 
(see Figure 2).11 Therefore, the new index makes theoretical sense when viewed 
in conjunction with prior work on the relationship between the economic 
development of a country and patent protection levels. 
------------------------Figure 2 goes about here---------------------- 
6.  Conclusions 
It has long been recognized that a host country’s patent system has an important 
effect on the strategies and decision-taking of multinational enterprises 
(MNEs), not least because it shapes their ability to appropriate returns on their 
investments in R&D and innovation (Ghauri & Rao, 2009, Maskus, 2000; 
Teece, 2006). In the post-TRIPs era, the formal patent protection regimes of 
countries have converged as governments have sought to improve and 
harmonize book-law protection levels to align them to international standards 
and norms as part of their obligations as signatory States. However, problems 
associated with the enforcement of book-law in practice means that MNEs 
continue to experience difficulties in upholding their patent rights around the 
world and countering the threat of illegal imitation and infringement (USTR, 
2013; OECD, 2009). Hitherto, researchers investigating the relationship 
 
10 With the exception of Taiwan (ROC), for which GDP per capita data were collected from the 
International Monetary Fund (2012) World Economic Outlook database. 
11 This contrasts with the correlation coefficient of the GP index which, when regressed with 
GDP per capita data, receives a score of 0.34 and an R2 of 0.14. In passing it should be noted 
that during the estimation of the bivariate model a log-linear specification was adopted. The 
model was free from any problems associated with violations of the assumptions pertaining to 
the Classical Linear Regression model.  
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between patent rights and the behaviour of economic actors have generally 
employed the indices of Ginarte and Park (1997) and Park (2008) in empirical 
work. However, these indices specifically measure the book-law conditions of a 
country and not the enforcement dimensions of the patent system. Hence, the 
main theoretical and empirical contributions of this study are threefold. First is 
the development of a new index which extends the GP indices by capturing the 
important role played by the enforcement dimension of a national patent system 
and how this is perceived by managers. Second is the development of a 
conceptual framework which identifies the costs experienced by firms as they 
engage and interact with a national patent system. Our third contribution 
concerns the application of a methodology which is fully transparent, following 
established and reliable procedures recommended by the OECD (2008).  
Several important implications for research and managerial practice arise from 
these contributions. 
6.1 Implications for research and policy-making 
The new index of international patent systems strength reported here provides 
up-to-date information for a good mix of developing and developed countries. 
We expect it to be a useful tool for researchers investigating a range of 
contemporary international business issues and a variety of different macro-
economic phenomena across a broad set of country types. Similarly, the index 
should be helpful to empiricists (e.g. from international economic and 
developmental organizations) who are looking to model and understand the 
policy implications of macro-economic and institution-related phenomena from 
a patent-related perspective. Importantly, the choice of measures is now 
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expanded so that researchers can employ the new index in order to proxy for the 
overall impact of the enforcement dimension of a national patent system, should 
theory necessitate it. At the same time, the new index can be used alongside the 
GP indices if differential effects of both the book-law and enforcement aspects 
of national patent systems are under investigation or are anticipated. Moreover, 
because we follow standard OECD (2008) guidelines for the construction of 
composite indicators, the new index can be replicated and extended readily, 
updated regularly, and applied in future research in combination with datasets 
constructed using the same or similar methodological approaches, should this 
be required. 
6.2 Managerial relevance 
Our study has implications for the management of the firm, especially in an 
international context. Firstly, we provide a framework which illustrates and 
highlights key aspects of patent enforcement mechanisms that managers should 
take into account when evaluating the patent system of countries. It is not 
sufficient for an assessment of the legal framework of host countries to be 
restricted to the state of book-law protection. This is because there is a clear 
contrast between levels of book-law protection on the one hand and the 
enforcement system (as it is perceived by managers) on the other, as the new 
index reveals for the majority of countries covered. In other words, when legal 
protection for protectable technology is readily available, adequate enforcement 
of these rights might not be. Secondly, and it follows, rather than simply 
responding to infringement issues as they arise, managers should be cognizant 
of, and sensitive to, the nature of local patent protection and enforcement levels 
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as they formulate strategies and take decisions when developing business 
activities abroad. Whilst it is relatively straightforward to establish the state of 
book-law protection, since this is codified and reported by most countries, it is 
much harder to determine a priori how well government agencies enforce these 
laws in practice, especially for inexperienced or under-resourced firms. 
Managers will be able to use the new index to identify those countries where 
the enforcement aspect of the patent system is liable to be problematic or to 
consider numerical values that may confirm or reject their preconceptions. 
Although such knowledge can be acquired using in-house or external legal 
expertise, it is nevertheless important that product and area managers also 
understand the implications arising from weak patent systems in countries, 
since this is likely to determine their ability to appropriate returns on market 
entry and development and, it follows, influence the costs of international 
expansion. In countries where patent systems are weaker, managers are likely to 
experience greater transaction costs as they engage with enforcement issues. 
For example, for R&D, technology and licensing managers, this may arise from 
the need to introduce or make more stringent those security systems, procedures 
and organizational structures implemented to mitigate the threat of technology 
leakage to rivals. For product and supply chain managers this may arise from 
the greater resources allocated to, and expended on, engaging with local 
organizations such as the police, customs officers, IP-specialist firms and other 
patent enforcement-related agencies (Hopkins, Kontnik & Turngage, 2003; 
Staake & Fleisch, 2010). Following the argumentation of Peng et al. (2009), 
managers should evaluate the role of differential patent enforcement levels 
36 
 
alongside an understanding of both industry-specific competitive forces and the 
resources and managerial capabilities of their firm when designing and 
implementing an international expansion and development strategy. The new 
international patent systems strength index provides valuable information on 
perceptions about variable patent enforcement levels across countries.  
6.3 Limitations and future research 
The limitations of our study provide pointers for future research opportunities. 
First, to design the new index, we incorporate those enforcement aspects of the 
patent system that have become increasingly relevant in the post-TRIPS era. It 
is foreseeable that new patent enforcement-related treaties will be negotiated 
and concluded by countries. These may bring to the fore additional and related 
factors and concerns which are not addressed by the new index. Subject to data 
availability, our conceptual framework and theoretical approach can be used by 
future researchers to identify new variables and data to develop proxies for such 
additional factors under the relevant transaction costs construct depicted in 
Table 1. This is because no matter how many aspects of the patent system are 
measured, their theorized effect will continue to impact upon the three types of 
transaction costs we consider in the new index. If the new index is to be 
extended, the fundamental structure underpinning its measurement remains 
unchanged. Secondly, and depending on data availability, a comparable 
methodology to ours could be followed to develop patent-related indices for 
specific industries or sectors. Finally, it would be interesting to revisit studies 
on the relationship between patent systems and international business activity 
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by incorporating the new index reported here to see if enforcement-related 
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Table 1.  
Transaction costs originating from the patent system and proxies used to calculate the new composite index 
Cost Type Component of the Patent System Data and Sources 
Servicing Costs Quality of patent administration 
Bureaucracy quality index (ICRG) 





“Judicial independence” (GCR) 
“Law and order” (ICRG) 
“Justice is fairly administered” (WCY) 
Level of corruption in judiciary Corruption perceptions index (Transparency International) 
Monitoring Costs 
Effectiveness of police enforcement Country listings from the Special 301 
Report (United States Trade Representative) 
(USTR) Strength of border controls 
Positive/negative perceptions of patent owners about 
national patent protection and enforcement levels 
Intellectual property rights (WCY) 
Intellectual property protection (GCR) 
Cultural and societal attitudes towards the purchase of 
infringing goods 
 
Global PC software piracy (BSA) 




Results of the “communalities table” for the monitoring, property rights protection and 





Monitoring Costs Construct   
WEF IP protection index 1.000 0.834 
IMD IPR index 1.000 0.816 
BSA piracy rates 1.000 0.768 
USTR Special 301 Report 1.000 0.723 
Property Rights Protection Costs 
Construct 
  
Corruption perceptions index 1.000 0.921 
WEF Judicial independence index 1.000 0.883 
IMD justice is fairly administrated 
index 
1.000 0.867 
ICRG law and order index 1.000 0.742 
Servicing Costs Construct   
ICRG bureaucracy quality index 1.000 0.847 
IMD bureaucracy does not hinder 
business activity index 
1.000 0.847 
















Servicing Costs Index 1.000 0.793 




Table 4.  
International patent systems strength index scores, average values (1998 to 2011) 
Argentina 3.6 Jordan 5.6 
Australia 8.8 Korea (South) 5.3 
Austria 8.3 Malaysia 5.5 
Belgium 7.2 Mexico 4.1 
Brazil 4.4 Netherlands 9.0 
Canada 8.9 New Zealand 9.4 
Chile 7.3 Norway 8.8 
China 4.2 Philippines 3.5 
Colombia 4.1 Poland 4.8 
Czech Republic 5.1 Portugal 6.6 
Denmark 9.5 Romania 4.0 
Finland 9.5 Russia 3.1 
France 7.2 Singapore 9.2 
Germany 8.2 Slovakia 4.8 
Greece 5.0 S. Africa 5.4 
Hong Kong 8.2 Spain 6.9 
Hungary 5.6 Sweden 9.3 
Iceland 9.1 Switzerland 9.0 
India 4.0 Taiwan (ROC) 6.1 
Indonesia 3.1 Thailand 4.2 
Ireland 7.9 Turkey 4.4 
Israel 7.0 Ukraine 3.1 
Italy 5.3 United Kingdom 8.5 
Japan 7.4 Venezuela 2.9 




National patent systems strength index scores (annually for the period 1998 to 2011) 
Country 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 
Argentina 3.8 3.8 4.2 4.1 3.3 3.1 3.1 3.4 3.5 3.5 3.5 3.5 3.6 3.6 
Australia 8.8 8.9 8.6 8.7 8.8 8.9 8.9 8.9 8.8 8.8 8.8 8.8 8.8 8.9 
Austria 7.9 8.0 8.1 8.2 8.1 8.2 8.6 8.8 8.7 8.4 8.4 8.2 8.2 8.0 
Belgium 5.9 5.9 6.6 7.0 7.3 7.7 7.7 7.6 7.6 7.4 7.6 7.4 7.4 7.7 
Brazil 4.6 4.7 4.6 4.6 4.6 4.5 4.5 4.2 3.9 4.1 4.1 4.3 4.2 4.4 
Canada 9.3 9.3 9.3 9.0 9.1 8.7 8.7 8.5 8.6 8.8 8.8 8.8 8.9 8.8 
Chile 7.0 7.1 7.5 7.5 7.5 7.5 7.5 7.3 7.3 7.1 7.0 6.9 7.3 7.4 
China 4.3 4.1 3.9 4.2 4.3 4.2 4.2 4.0 4.1 4.3 4.4 4.4 4.3 4.3 
Colombia 3.0 3.6 3.8 4.2 4.1 4.2 4.3 4.5 4.5 4.4 4.4 4.2 4.1 4.0 
Czech Republic 5.4 5.2 5.0 4.6 4.5 4.6 4.9 5.0 5.3 5.6 5.7 5.4 5.2 5.0 
Denmark 9.8 9.9 9.7 9.5 9.5 9.5 9.5 9.5 9.5 9.4 9.4 9.4 9.3 9.4 
Finland 9.6 9.7 9.9 9.8 9.7 9.7 9.6 9.5 9.6 9.4 9.1 9.0 9.3 9.4 
France 7.1 7.1 7.1 7.2 6.6 7.2 7.4 7.7 7.6 7.6 7.3 7.2 7.2 7.3 
Germany 8.2 8.3 8.0 7.8 7.7 8.0 8.4 8.4 8.3 8.1 8.2 8.2 8.2 8.2 
Greece 5.4 5.4 5.5 4.9 4.9 5.0 5.0 5.0 5.1 5.2 5.3 4.5 4.3 4.2 
Hong Kong 8.0 7.8 7.8 8.0 8.3 8.1 8.1 8.3 8.4 8.4 8.3 8.3 8.5 8.5 
Hungary 5.6 5.9 5.8 5.9 5.5 5.4 5.4 5.5 5.7 5.8 5.6 5.6 5.2 5.2 
Iceland - - - - - - - 9.6 9.5 9.2 9.0 8.8 8.6 8.4 
India 3.9 3.9 3.9 3.8 3.8 3.8 3.8 4.0 4.4 4.5 4.3 4.3 4.2 4.0 
Indonesia 2.9 2.6 2.6 2.7 2.7 2.8 3.0 3.1 3.2 3.1 3.4 3.6 3.7 3.8 
Ireland 8.4 8.0 7.6 7.9 7.4 7.8 7.8 7.8 7.8 7.9 8.0 8.3 8.2 7.9 
Israel 7.5 7.3 7.1 7.9 7.6 7.5 6.9 6.8 6.6 6.7 6.5 6.6 6.7 6.4 
Italy 5.2 5.3 5.2 6.0 5.7 5.7 5.2 5.4 5.3 5.6 5.3 4.8 4.5 4.6 
Japan 6.4 6.6 6.9 7.4 7.3 7.2 7.3 7.6 7.9 7.8 7.6 7.9 8.0 8.2 
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Jordan - - - - - 5.3 5.8 6.1 5.8 5.4 5.7 5.6 5.3 5.1 
Korea (South) 4.8 4.5 4.7 4.8 5.1 5.0 5.2 5.6 5.6 5.8 6.1 5.9 5.8 5.8 
Malaysia 5.9 5.6 5.3 5.4 5.5 5.8 5.7 5.8 5.7 5.8 5.7 5.2 5.1 5.1 
Mexico 4.0 4.1 4.0 4.3 4.1 4.2 4.2 4.1 4.0 4.2 4.2 3.9 3.7 3.7 
Netherlands 9.1 9.1 9.1 9.0 9.1 9.0 8.8 8.7 8.9 9.1 9.0 9.0 8.9 9.0 
New Zealand 9.4 9.4 9.4 9.4 9.4 9.4 9.5 9.5 9.5 9.4 9.3 9.4 9.3 9.5 
Norway 9.1 8.9 9.1 8.7 8.6 8.8 9.0 8.9 8.9 8.8 8.2 8.7 8.7 9.1 
Philippines 4.0 4.3 3.7 3.7 3.4 3.3 3.4 3.3 3.3 3.3 3.2 3.2 3.2 3.4 
Poland 5.2 4.9 4.8 4.8 4.6 4.3 4.1 4.1 4.3 4.7 5.1 5.4 5.7 5.9 
Portugal 6.8 7.0 6.7 6.6 6.7 6.9 6.7 6.8 6.9 6.8 6.4 6.2 6.2 6.3 
Romania - - - - - 3.5 3.6 3.6 3.7 4.2 4.3 4.4 4.3 4.2 
Russia 3.2 3.1 2.9 3.1 3.3 3.3 3.5 3.1 3.2 3.1 2.9 3.0 2.9 3.1 
Singapore 9.0 9.0 9.1 9.2 9.2 9.3 9.2 9.3 9.3 9.2 9.2 9.2 9.2 9.1 
Slovakia - - - 4.4 4.3 4.3 4.6 4.9 5.2 5.3 5.4 5.0 4.8 4.5 
S. Africa 5.7 5.5 5.6 5.4 5.5 5.1 5.4 5.2 5.3 5.7 5.5 5.3 5.1 4.9 
Spain 6.5 6.9 7.3 7.3 7.2 7.0 7.2 7.1 6.9 6.8 6.7 6.3 6.3 6.4 
Sweden 9.4 9.4 9.3 9.1 9.3 9.3 9.2 9.1 9.2 9.3 9.3 9.3 9.3 9.3 
Switzerland 9.0 9.0 8.8 8.7 8.6 8.9 9.1 9.1 9.1 9.1 9.1 9.1 8.8 8.9 
Taiwan (ROC) 5.7 6.0 5.9 6.2 5.9 6.1 6.0 6.3 6.2 6.1 6.1 6.0 6.2 6.5 
Thailand 4.0 4.1 4.1 4.1 4.1 4.2 4.4 4.6 4.4 4.2 4.3 4.2 4.3 4.2 
Turkey 4.2 4.3 4.5 4.3 3.9 3.8 3.9 4.2 4.5 4.7 5.1 4.9 4.8 4.7 
Ukraine - - - - - - - - - 3.4 3.2 2.9 3.1 3.0 
United Kingdom 8.8 8.7 8.9 8.5 8.8 8.8 8.7 8.7 8.7 8.5 7.9 8.0 7.9 8.1 








National patent systems strength index scores compared with Park (2008) for the year 2005. 
55 
 
Figure 2.  
Regression of the national patent systems strength scores and GDP per capita (US$) 
 
